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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE LEVER ACT.-

The anomalous legal situation which existed for some time in
Pennsylvania, due to the fact that while in the eastern section of
the State prosecutions against alleged profiteers under the Lever

Act' had been enjoined by order of court,2 yet in the western section their validity had been recognized, 3 is but indicative of the
situation throughout the country. The activity of the Attorney
General in waging a campaign against overcharging for necessaries

has brought the question squarely before the courts in the different
circuits, with the result that there is now pending before the Supreme Court the final determination of the constitutionality of
the Act in general, and of specific provisions in particular.
I Act Aug. 10, 1917, c. 53, 40 Stat. 276, as amended Oct. 22, 1919, c. 80,
41 Stat. 297.
2 Lamborn v. McAvoy, 265 Fed. 944 (1920).

3 United States v. Rosenblum, 264 Fed. 578 (1920). In an unreported
decision Oct. 21, 1920, this court also declared the Act unconstitutional in part.

NOTES

The authority of Congress to pass such a measure has been
uniformly acknowledged by the lower Federal courts; it is only
in construing Section 4 of the Act that the courts have shown
marked differences of opinion. Prosecutions for alleged profiteering have been brought under the provisions of this section which
makes it unlawful "for any person to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge, in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries." The pleadings to indictments have disclosed for the most
part a common basis of defense, viz.: (i) A food control Act,
such as this Act purports to be, is unconstitutional in that it violates the Fifth Amendment in lacking due process, and the
Tenth Amendment in not being a fit subject of Federal legislation; (2) Section 4 of the Act is void for the reason that it does
not state with sufficient definiteness the conduct prohibited, and
furthermore it contains an arbitrary classification exempting farmers, gardners, etc., from the effect of its provisions; (3) Section 4
of the Act, made effective by Amendment in October, 1919, 4 cannot be considered as a war measure nor of continuing force at the
present time.
The lower courts have had little difficulty in concluding that
Congress in the exercise of its war powers 5 might regulate the
price and distribution of necessaries as defined in the Act,6 even
though such regulation concerns transactions which are distinctly
intra-state in character. The attitude of the courts in one sense
is a striking one.7 It has been a fundamental principle of our
law that a man may ask for his wares or services whatever price
he is able to get and others are willing to pay, and that no one can
compel him to take less, although the price may be so exorbitant
as to be extortionate.8 The common law has not had the notion--so familiar on the Continent of Europe-of the nation in
its collective and corporate sense, entrusted with broad powers
for subordinating the individual rights of property holders to a
general good and vitally interested in the cost of commodities.9
4
Section 4 as originally enacted conta ned no penalty provision, and for
this reason was declared inoperative. United States v. Mossew, 261 Fed. 999
(1919), aff. 266 Fed. 18 (1920).
5 Article I, Sec. 8, Clauses I, II, 12, 13, 14, I5, 16, 18.
6

692.

Sec. I, as amended Oct. 22, 1919, c. 8o, 41 Stat. 297.

See "War-time Legislation-i917" by Judge Hough, 3x Harvard L. R.

8 Tiedeman "State and Federal Control of Persons and Property" (2nd
Ed.) Sec. 96. This broad proposition has heretofore been modified by the
courts in two sets of circumstances: (I) where a business is carried on by or
in connection with some franchise or privilege from the State (Cooley, "Principles of Constitution," p. 234); (2) where services have become affected with
a "public interest" through monopoly or otherwise for which see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. I13 (5876); Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391 (1894); and the
extension of the principle in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389
(914).
9 The notable exceptions to this proposition are the early Assize of Bread
and Ale (Time Uncertain) and the Statute of Laborers, 23 Ed. III, c. 6 (1349).
The wording of the latter in part is identical with the Lever Act. It forbade
victuallers from charging more than a "reasonable price, having respect to the
price that such victual be sold at places adjoining, so that the same sellers shall
have moderate gains, and not excessive."
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It is to be noted that this Act, reaching down as it does to compel
obedience by the corner grocery man when he sells a pound of
sugar, has been held valid by the courts, without calling upon
theory or citations to strengthen their opinions. The courts have
sensed the legislation to be proper, and, as stated in United States
v. Oglesby Grocery Company,10 have proceeded on the broad principle that "the powers of Congress in time of war are comparable
to the police powers of the States in time of peace, and equally
incapable of express limitations." I
While no legislation in the past exists as a precedent for
the Act under consideration, yet the power of Congress to pass
such a measure will undoubtedly be recognized by the Supreme
Court, as a means "necessary and proper" for the effective exercise of the war powers. The measures open to Congress in carrying on war are not definitely limited by the Constitution. The
war powers are not limited to victories in the field, but according
to the court in Stewart v. Kahn12 carry with them "inherently
the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict
and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress." The delegation of a power to the Federal Government
carries with it the implied power to employ all means, not prohibited, which are reasonably conducive to the attainment of the
legitimate end. 13 That the successful waging of the recent war
was dependent as much upon centralized economic control as
upon the raising of armies seems to admit of no doubt. To argue
that the power does not exist to husband and make more equitable the distribution of necessaries at a time when necessaries
might be put beyond the reach of a large body of the people, would
be to deny the right of waging an effective war under modern industrial conditions.4 If then the control of food and necessaries,
including the regulation of prices, is a power necessary and proper
for the carrying on of war, the fact that the regulation extends
to transactions within the boundaries of the several States is
immaterial. State boundaries are no barrier to the operation of
a Federal law passed under authority vested in Congress.
10 264 Fed. 692 (1920).
11Weed v. Lockwood, 264

Fed. 453 (192o) aff. C. C. A. 2d Cir. 1920 (semble). "Food and wearing apparel control during a war emergency are properly
the subject for war legislation and by limiting charges for such necessaries,
Congress does not take property without due process of law; (semble) United
States v. Swedlow, 264 Fed. ioI6 (1920): "The act is one of many passed by
Congress solely for war purposes, and valid only because it was an exercise of
the war power"; (semble) United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 264 Fed. 2x8
(1920): "It
is, of course, fundamental that the constitutionality of the Act
depends upon whether at the time it was passed and approved there existed a
state of war."
12 I Wall. 493 (1870).
23
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1839).
14 See foreign "Government Regulation of Prices During the War"-Cong.
Rec. 65th Cong., I Sess., June 18, 3937, p. 3779.

NOTES

The power of food control being inherent in the war power,
it is yet to be determined whether its exercise in the regulation of
prices is in violation of the Fifth Amendment with its provision
that no person shall be deprived of property without due process
of law. The Act in regulating prices of commodities does not
provide for compensation in return. The right to property includes the right to dispose of it for a price. Does a law restricting
this price to a reasonable charge lack due process? The question
may be viewed from two angles: first, how does the Fifth Amendment limit Congress in the exercise of any of its powers? Second,
what limitation is to be opposed to the war power?
The principle that the limitations placed upon Congress by
the Fifth Amendment are no greater than those placed upon the
States, in the exercise of their police powers, by the Fourteenth
Amendment, has received authoritative declaration) 5 It is submitted that, following the principle announced in Munn v. Illi16
nois
and subsequent cases, 17 whenever staple articles recognized
as necessaries become clothed with a "public interest" in that
their price and distribution vitally affect public welfare, the State
in the exercise of the police power may regulate the price to be
charged therefor, as well as the method of distribution.', Viewing
the war power of Congress in the same light as any other power,
it would follow that, since under Munn v. Illinois and similar
cases the State would be justified in calling the price and distribution of food as a matter of public concern if it were faced
with a situation calling for such action, and since this action could
be taken in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
could likewise, in a lawful sphere of power, enact the present Act
without contravening the rights set up by the Fifth Amendment."
A fortiori, it follows that Congress when exercising a war
power is not limited in the present case by the Fifth Amendment.
It is true that the war powers are subject to "applicable Constitu1tIn re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448 (1889); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1920).

18 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
17 People v. Budd, 143 U. S. 517 (1891); Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S.
391 (1894); Insurance Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389 (1914).
18Weed v. Lockwood, 264 Fed. 453 (1920); Opinion of the Justices, 182
Mass. 605 (1904).

19In this connection it is to be noted that Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking
for the court in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra, declares that
"if the nature and condition of a restriction upon the use or disposition of property is such that a State could, under the police power, impose consistently
with the Fourteenth Amendment without making compensation, then the
United States may for a permitted purpose impose a like restriction consistently
with the Fifth Amendment, without making compensation." By taking this
test as an ultimate one, rather than as a convenient one, the court in United
States v. Spokane Dry Goods Co., 264 Fed. 209 (1920) found some difficulty
in justifying a food control act, whereas the court in Weed v. Lockwood, sitpra,
taking the test as given, found a price fixing power in the State under Munn v.
Illinois, supra.
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tional limitations," and that the Constitution limits Congress
in war as well as in peace. 20 In taking their stand on the due
process provision of the Fifth Amendment, those who urge that
the economic control given by the Act is unconstitutional are
asserting an extreme individualism as opposed to the impulse of
self-preservation. According to Willoughby "the power to wage
war carries with it the authority to override in many particulars
rights which in time of peace are inviolable."21 Rights and liabilities under the common law are not static, but are in a state of
growth and adaptation, so that a historical survey of the meaning
of due process is not to be taken as the last word on the subject.
The guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is secured if the laws
operate on all alike, without subjecting the individual t6 an arbitrary exercise of power. 22 Considering the purpose of the Act
and the times which called it forth, there is little likelihood that
the Supreme Court will find the power exerted by Congress through
the President to be arbitrary or subversive of the general principles which govern society.
The contention that Section 4 of the Act is void in that it
does not state what is an unjust or unreasonable rate or charge,
and due to the fact that it contains an arbitrary exemption clause,
is undoubtedly the proposition upon which those questioning the
validity of the prosecutions instituted under it are making their
strongest stand." The argument has caused the courts in four
well considered cases to declare the Section unconstitutional.24
On the other hand, seven courts while recognizing the force of
the argument have refused
to accede to it, and have upheld the
25
validity of the Section.
20

Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 121, 127 (i866); United States v. Kress,
243 U. S. 3x6, 326 (i926); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., supra.
21 Willoughby "Constitutional Law," Vol. 2, Sec. 715.
2 Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes,
115 U. S. 512, 519 (1885);
Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S.657 (1892).

2 Section 4 as amended reads in part as follows: "It is hereby made
unlawful for any person to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in
handling or dealing in or with any necessaries; to conspire to exact excessive
prices for any necessaries. Provided, that this section shall not apply to any
farmer, gardner, or other agriculturist with respect to the farm products produced or raised upon land owned, leased or cultivated by him; provided further,
that nothing in this Act shall be construed to make unlawful collective bargaining by association of farmers with respect to the farm products," etc.
24Creamery Company v. Kinnane, 264 Fed. 845 (1920); United States v.

Cohen Grocery Co., 264 Fed. 218 (2920); United States v. Armstrong, 265 Fed.
683 (1920); Lamborn v. McAvoy, 265 Fed. 944 (2920).
25Weed v. Lockwood, 264 Fed. 453 (192o) aff. C. C. A. (2920); United
States v. Swedlow, 264 Fed. ioi6 (2920); United States v. Myatt, 264 Fed.
442 (2920); United States v. Rosenblum, 264 Fed. 578 (1920); United States vOglesby Grocery Co., 264 Fed. 692 (1920); United States v. Merritt, 264 Fed.
872 (1920); United States v. Russel, 265 Fed. 714 (1920). In United States v.
American Woolen Co., 265 Fed. 404 (1920) the court held woolen cloth not to
be a necessary within the act; in United States v. Robinson, 266 Fed. 240 (2920)
an indictment drawn in the general terms of the Section was held to be defective.

NOTES

It is admitted that criminal statutes ought "to be plainly
and clearly, and not cunningly and darkly penned." No criminal
statute can be sustained unless its mandates are clearly expressed
so that an ordinary person can know in advance how to regulate
his conduct to conform therewith26 If the mandates are not
set down with sufficient definiteness the statute is void as lacking
due process and is violative of the Sixth Amendment which guarantees that the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation, and the accompanying
right that a criminal act must have previously been defined. The
Section in making unlawful the exaction of an "unjust or un2
reasonable rate or charge" is to stand or fall with these words. 7
That it presents a difficult problem in some aspects to a dealer
in necessaries is patent. According to the court in Lamborn v.
McAvoy, supra, "the Statute leaves it uncertain whether a man
may lawfully base the price of his commodity upon a profit over
the original price, whether he may make a price based on general
market conditions, whether his selling price may be based upon
the cost he would have to incur to replace the merchandise, and
in general the jury may speculate as to any line of conduct, whether
it would or would not justify a rate or charge, in determining
whether it was unjust or unreasonable." The cataloguing of these
difficulties confronting the merchant, however, should not disguise the fact that the single question is, admitting all these difficulties, did John Doe in buying a commodity for $i.oo and in selling it for $I.5O make an unjust or unreasonable charge under the
circumstances? The difficulty of' proving that John Doe did such
a thing likewise should not affect the validity of the section. Its
validity depends upon whether the law can compel a man so to
regulate his conduct in the matter that it shall appear reasonable
to the jury. It is submitted that the law can do this very thing.
An examination of the lower courts' decisions on Section 4
brings out the fact that the validity of the section depends upon
whether a broad rule announced in Tozer v. United States2 8 has
found support in the adjudications of the Supreme Court. That
case held a statute prohibiting "undue preference" in railroad
26 United States v. Brewer, 139 U. S. 278, 288 (1891); International Har-

vester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216 (1913); United States v. Capital Traction
Co., 34 App. D. C. 592 (1910); Hewitt v. State Examiners, 148 Cal. 590 (19o6).
27 Under provisions of Sec. 2 of the Lever Act, authorizing the President
to employ any means to carry out the purpose of the Act, the President under
Executive Order dated Aug. 1O, 1917, created the United States Food Administration; further, in accordance with Sec. 5, the President by Proclamation dated
Oct. 8, 1917, 40 Stat. II, p. 1700, instituted a licensing system for thenecessaries
named in the proclamation; by Proclamation dated Nov. 21, 1919, the powers
of the Food Administration were transferred to the Attorney General, Stat.
66th Cong., I Sess., p. 34 Proc. It does not appear that prices of necessaries
were fixed in various localities, as far as the brokerage or retail trade was concerned.
28 52 Fed. 917 (1892).
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rates void for uncertainty. The rule was announced that "the
criminality of an act cannot be made to depend upon whether a
jury might think it reasonable or unreasonable." If the rule as
stated is correct, Section 4 cannot be sustained. It is submitted
that the rule has not been recognized by the Supreme Court, but
on the contrary has been disapproved, if not flatly overthrown,
by the "rule of reason" announced by the court in the interpreation of the Sherman Act. 29 In applying this rule of reason to
a criminal prosecution instituted under the Sherman Act, the court
in Nash v. United States 0 upheld an indictment charging an
"unreasonable restraint of trade." The fact that no standard of
reasonableness was set by the statute did not invalidate it. This
case was followed by International Harvester Company v. Kentuckys- in which a criminal statute making unlawful the enhancing
or depreciating the price of a commodity either above or below
its "real value" was declared invalid. The case was distinguished
from the Nash case supra, and in its opinion the court states clearly
the reason for the distinction. It pointed out that the statute
in Nash v. United Statds in requiring men to estimate a matter
of degree at their peril "dealt with an actual, not with an imaginary condition other than the facts," whereas in the case under
review the statute concerned itself with "real value" where the
elements necessary to determine this imaginary ideal were "both
uncertain in nature and degree of effect to the acutest commercial
mind." In short, the statute prohibiting an unreasonable restraint
of trade dealt. with a situation which was concrete, and known
or capable of being known to the ordinary person, and was therefore valid even though it required a man at his peril to estimate
a matter of degree.3 ' Applying the court's own distinction to
Section 4 of the Lever Act, it would appear to be decisive of its
validity. Section 4 concerns itself with an actual concrete problem, not an imaginary condition; it deals with the factum of bargain and sale under actual surrounding conditions as they exist
in different localities and at different times; it calls upon the merchant to judge of the fairness of his practice.
2 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. I (I9io); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. io6 (igio); both cases interpreting Sherman Act, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in giving the decision, said
30 229 U. S. 376 (1912).
in part: "But apart from the common law as to restraint of trade thus taken
up by the Statute, the law is full of'instances where a man's fate depends on
his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it somematter
of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine-he may incur

the penalty of death."

(semble) Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426 (1915) where

a statute requiring a hotel-keeper to do "all in his power" to save guests in case
of fire was held valid.
30a
31 234 U. S. 216 (1913).

See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas,

212

U. S. 86 (I909), where a statute

was upheld prohibiting contracts "reasonably calculated" to fix or regulate
prices.

NOTES

Irrespective of the authority of Nash v. United States, it is
to be noted that the idea of reasonableness is not unknown to the
criminal law. As stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, "there are cases
in which the criminal law requires a man to know facts at his
peril. Indeed, the criterion which is thought to be free from constitutional objection, the criterion of fault, is the application of
an external standard, the conduct of a prudent man in the known
circumstances, that is, in doubtful cases, the opinion of the jury,
which the defendant has to satisfy at his peril and which he may
miss after giving the matter his best thought. ' '3 2 It is no more
without due process to require a man to know what is a reasonable
charge or rate than to require him to know what is unfair competition in trade, what constitutes using the mails to defraud, what
is the line between criminal negligence and the act of a prudent
man, or what conduct would justify him as a reasonable man in
killing another. Courts should give practical construction to
statutes if possible. Section 4 may be construed to forbid, in
time of war, any departure from the usual ratio of charges and
profits which obtained in peace times, and which are not justified
by special surrounding circumstances. The validity of the Section on this point should be upheld. 33
The further objection will be raised that Section 4 is rendered
invalid by the provision that it shall not apply to "any farmer,
gardner, horticulturist or other agriculturist with respect to the
farm products produced or raised upon land owned, leased or
cultivated by him." Due process within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment is secured if the laws operate on all alike; purely
arbitrary enactments directed against individuals or classes are4
held not to be "the law of the land" or to conform to due process.
Arbitrary classification of particular individuals or groups, exempting them from duties or privileges, amounts to a denial of due
process.35 Mere inequality before the law is not to be the test of
the validity of the classification, since classification presupposes
inequality. The test is whether the power of classification has
been arbitrarily employed. It is a broad power and its exercise
is not to be stricken down unless it is arbitrary beyond a doubt.36
In urging the arbitrary character of the classification contained in Section 4 the case of Connolly v. The Pipe Company 37
will be cogent authority. There the Anti-Trust Statute of Illinois
32Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 432 (1918).

1 The courts in Lamborn v. McAvoy, supra, and United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., supra, distinguish Nash v. United States, supra, and refuse to
follow it in the present instance on the ground that the Statute in that case
simply defined a common law crime. It is submitted that such a distinction
is not justified
by the decision or its later interpretation.
34
McGehee Due Process of Law, p. 6o.
35Willoughby Constitutional Law, p. 873, 874.
3 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, supra; Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, U. S. Sup. Ct. Advanced Opinions i919-2o, p. 658.
37184 U. S.540 (191o).
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prohibiting combinations to raise prices in commodities was held
invalid due to a clause exempting from its provisions "agricultural products or live stock while in the hands of the producer or
raiser." If the present measure were a peace time measure it is
difficult to see how the present exemption of farmers could be
upheld, in view of this decision. As a war measure the exemption
of the farmer from its provisions may reasonably be said to be
conducive of increased production of food necessaries. The exemption did not do away with the liability of the farmer organizations to the Anti-Trust Acts, and was limited in effect to the
products of their own lands. The wisdom of the exemption may
be condemned from the standpoint of political policy but that is
not a problem for the court. Since there is a fair basis for the
classification under the pressing circumstances, the statute should
not be declared invalid because of the exemption clause 38
The objection that Section 4, amended and made effective
October 22, i919, eleven months after the armistice with the enemy
powers, was not a war measure, will undoubtedly be disposed of
by the Supreme Court on the basis of the decision19 upholding the
the Volstead Act 40 passed October 28, 1919, as a war
validity of
4
measure. '
How will the court look upon this legislation when the same
question is brought before it approximately one year later, when
most, if not all, war activities and agencies have been discontinued?
The time limited in the Act when it should become inoperative
has not arrived, 42 since peace has not been made with the enemy
powers. The silence of the President and Congress on the subject
of the law's repeal should be determinative for the Court that
in the judgment of the executive and legislative branches a necessity still exists for its continued validity.
The opinion of the Supreme Court is awaited with increasing
interest not simply for its effect on the contemplated prosecutions
against the coal miners and operators, but from the standpoint
of the court's dealing with war powers under modern conditions.
J. R. Jr.
3 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, in which a
license tax placed on the business of sugar refining exemptinglfrom its provisions
planters and growers who refined their own sugar was upheld; International
Harvester Company v. Missouri, sypra, in which the State Anti-Trust Statute
exempting the vendors of labor or services from its provisions was upheld.
9Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S.264 (192o).
40 C. 83, Stat. 66th Cong., I Sess. i919.
4The dissenting opinion inter alia in declaring the Volstead Act invalid

expressed the belief that no war necessity existed to justify the legislation. "The
powers of Congress should be restricted to actual necessities consequent upon
war."

42
Sec. 24. "The provisions of this Act shall cease to be in effect when
the existing state of war between the United States and Germany shall have
terminated, and the fact and date of such determination shall be ascertained
and proclaimed by the President."

NOTES
PERSONAL PROPERTY-UNPATENTED

INVENTIONS.-The de-

termination of what is personal property and what is not is in its
metaphysical and legal aspect a problem not free from considerable difficulty. If the law were an immutable body of maxims
and definitions it would be a comparatively easy matter to ascertain whether certain things alleged to be property fall within the
definitions. However, due to the great increase in commerce
during the past few centuries and the increasingly complex interrelationships between the different members of organized society
resulting therefrom, the courts are constantly confronted with
new situations and problems. Thus in the earnest efforts of the
Judiciary to grant new remedies under old forms, the classic definitions strained to cover one case, enlarged to cover another, become
unlike their former selves and fail to cover problems with their
former exactitude and nicety, with the result that Coke, Littleton
and other authorities of former days would scarce recognize their
modern meanings.
This is especially well illustrated by the courts of equity
which in their efforts to mete out justice have still confined their
jurisdiction to cases affecting property rights, but have extended
the definitions to cover cases never contemplated in the early
history of the courts. So it has been held that secret processes
discovered by an employee of a firm in pursuance of an employment for that purpose become the property of the firm without
an express assignment,' and that an employee is bound to disclose a secret process discovered by him in the course of his employment.2 Since these and similar cases have been decided on the
theory that equity would assist the employer on the ground that
his property rights were being infringed, the conclusion would
seem to follow that the courts recognize property rights in these
unpatented inventions and that therefore the inventions or discoveries are in themselves property, for it is fundamental that
property rights are inherent only in that which is itself property.
The fallacy of this reasoning is readily apparent when it is remembered that the courts of equity do not interfere to protect property
rights in the unpatented invention, but only to prevent the employee from making use of the discovery so as to decrease the
pecuniary return that might result therefrom to the employer,
and affect his property rights in this manner.
The question as to whether an invention, before application
has been made for a patent, is property so as to constitute an
asset in bankruptcy 3 was brought up squarely for the first time in
I Baldwin v. Von Micheroux, .5 Misc. 386; 2.5 N. Y. S. 857 (893).
2 Silver

Spring B. & D. Co. v. Woolworth, 16 R. I.

729;

i9 At.

528 (1890).

Dempsey v. J. & J. Dobson, 174 Pa. 122; 34 Atl. 528 (1896).

3 The following rights were held to be assets in bankruptc proceedings:

A license to sell liquor. Re Becker, 98 Fed. 407 (9oo).
A license to use a
market stall. Re Emrich, iox Fed. 231 (i9oo). A seat on a stock exchange.
In re Page 102 Fed. 746 (i9oo) affirmed in 287 U. S. 596 (i9o2).
A wife's right

to elect to take against her husband's will.

Tenbrook v. Jessup, 6o N. J. E.

235; 46 At. 516 (I9OO). But see Fleming's Estate, 217 Pa. 61o; 66 Atl. 874
(907) and Pike County v. Sowards, 147 Ky. 37; 143 S. W. 745 (1912), wherein

it was held the right of a husband to elect to take against his wife's will was a
"personal privilege" and was therefore not an asset in bankruptcy.
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a recent New York case! and was answered in the negalive. The
court proceeded on the theory that an invention, before application has been made for a patent lacks "the primary and essential
characteristic of property, viz., the capability of being exclusively
possessed, owned and used." But it is submitted, however, that a
patent once granted, which is universally held to be "property,"' 5
fails to answer the broad definition advanced by the court, inasmuch as a patent is a peculiar species of property unknown to the
common-law and unlike other property the right to its exclusive
possession and use is limited to that period of time prescribed
by the patent laws of the sovereign power granting the patent.
Not a little of the confusion as to the exact nature of an
unpatented invention is due to the loose use of the word "property" by the courts, and the lay conception that any original idea
capable of being communicated and often-times, as in the case
of unpatented inventions, a thing of more or less value, is "property." Something akin to this idea is often found in the decisions.
Thus it has been held that an invention even before a patent has
been applied for is the subject of sale 6 and indeed there is a dictum
in one case to the effect that an unpatented invention is "property."' 7 The error arises from the confusion of that which has"existence" -with the term "property" which has a technical legal
meaning.
It is only upon the application for a patent that an invention can be properly called "property" 8 for until the application
has been made the inventor has merely a common-law right toenjoy the fruits of his- invention so long as he can- guard it; forupon discovery the secret inures to the benefit of the public. 9Thus it is quite evident that it is impossible to give any categorical
definition of the term "property,"'1 and that the solution of modern problems is not to be found in the old classical definitions
but only in the light of the modifications placed upon them by
the latest decisions.
J.S.
INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMODITIES

CLAUSE OF THE Ac'r-

OF CONGRESS REGULATING RAILROADS.-The

Act of Congress,

passed June 29, i9o6,1 popularly called the "Hepburn Act," contains a clause usually referred to as the "Commodities Clause."
4Rosenthal v. Goldstein, 183 N. Y. S.582 (1920).
5
Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U. S. (4 How.) 646 (1846); 20 R. C. L. 1178.
6 Ullman v. Thompson, 57 Ind. App. I26; io6 N. E. 611 (i9x4).
7Fisher v. Cushman, 103 Fed. 860 (igoo).
In re Myers-Wolf Mfg.
s In re Cantelo Mfg. Co., 185 Fed. 276 (1911).
Co., 2o5 Fed. 289 (1913). See contra the earlier cases of In re McDonell, IO
Fed. 239 (190). In re Dann, 129 Fed. 495 (1904).
9 Marsh v. Nichols, Shepard & Co., 128 U. S. 6o5 (1888).
10Fisher v. Cushman, supra.
234 Stat., L. 585, as amended by 36 Stat., L. 547.
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By it any railroad company engaged in interstate commerce is
prohibited from transporting in interstate commerce articles or
commodities "other than timber and the manufactured products
thereof, manufactured, mined, or produced by it, or under its
authority, or which it may own in whole, or in part, or in which
it may have any interest, direct or indirect, except such articles
or commodities as may be necessary and intended for its use in
the conduct of its business as a common carrier." The constitutionality of the clause was attacked in United States v. Delaware
and Hudson Co.,2 but it was held to be constitutional by the Supreme Court; the clause was susceptible of two constructions,
one of which raised grave constitutional questions; the other,
adopted by the Court, did not.3 This construction, and subsequent interpretations thereof in following cases form the subject
of this note.
The construction adopted by the Supreme Court in the Delaware and Hudson case makes it unlawful for such carrier to transport in interstate commerce articles or commodities: "(a) when
the article or commodity has been manufactured, mined, or produced by a carrier or under its authority, and at the time of transportation the carrier has not in good faith before the act of transportation dissociated itself from such article or commodity; (b)
when the carrier owns the article or commodity to be transported
in whole or in part; (c) when the carrier at the time of transportation has an interest direct or indirect, in a legal or equitable sense
in the article or commodity, not including, therefore, articles or
commodities manufactured, mined, produced or owned, etc., by
a bona fide corporation in which the railroad company is a stockholder." 4 This construction put no limitation on the extent of
stock ownership by a carrier in a manufacturing or producing
corporation so long as such corporation was bona fide. Consequently those carriers, whose form of corporate relationship with
coal companies was that of entire ownership of the stock, through
which they exercised control over such coal company as a distinct
corporation, did not change their organization. While these coal
companies existed as legal entities and were charged for transportation and demurrage by the railroad, the officers of the coal
company were officers of the railroad company and both corporations used the same offices.
In United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. 5 this form of
corporate relationship was held to be prohibited by the commodities clause. The right of a railroad company to use its stock
ownership for the purpose of a bona fide separate administration
of a corporation in which it has a stock interest, was not denied
by the Court, 6 but the use of such stock ownership and the "com2 United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 (x9o8).
3 Id., pp. 4o6 and 407.
4 Id., p. 415.
5 United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co.,
6 Id., p. 271.
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mingling of the affairs of such corporation with its own," so as to
make both corporations virtually one brings the railroad company
so related to such corporation within the prohibitions of the commodities clause.7
Under this construction of the clause it was thought that a
corporate relationship in which there was no commingling of the
affairs of the coal company with those of the railroad company
would not fall within the prohibitions of the clause. In 19o9,
after the decision in the Delaware and Hudson case, supra, the
Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, an owner
and operator of coal mines, organized such form of corporate relationship to conduct its coal business. While the railroad company retained title to the coal lands, the operating forces, accounting systems and assets of both corporations were separate and
distinct. The executive staffs of both the railroad and the coal
companies were the same. Most of the stock of the coal company
was bought by the stockholders of the railroad company and the
greater part of this stock was later sold on the market by these
purchasers. Under its contract with the railroad, the coal company could not buy coal from any other producer nor could it
determine the amount of coal to be produced at any time. This
relationship was attacked in United States v. Del., Lack. & West.
R. R. Co.,8 and declared to be in violation of the prohibitions of
the clause. Unity of management is illegal under the clause
"for the policy of the statute requires that instead of being managed by the same officers, they should studiously and in good
faith avoid anything, either in contract or conduct, that remotely
savors of joint action, joint interest, or the dominance of one company by the other." 9 As a result of these decisions, stock ownership by a carrier in a manufacturing or producing company coupled
with a commingling of the affairs of such companies with those
of the carriers, and unity of management of the carrier and producing company, are brought within the prohibitions of the clause.
The reference to the "policy of the statute"10 is significant as a
foreshadowing of the decision of the Supreme Court in the latest
case to come before it under the commodities clause.
The Reading Company in its present corporate form has
existed since 1896. Roughly this form consisted of a holding
company, the Reading Company, which owned all the stock of
the Reading Railway Company and all the stock of the Philadelphia, and Reading Coal and Iron Company. The majority of
the directors of the Board of the Reading Railway and the Coal
and Iron Company were directors of the Reading Company and
were the same individuals. In all other respects the three corporations were distinct and separate. The Supreme Court in
7 Id., p. 274.

8United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 238 U. S.
516 (1914).
9Id., p. 536.
10Id., p. 536.
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United States v. Reading Company et all, decided that the combining in a single corporation the ownership of all the stock of a
carrier and all the stock of a coal company resulted in such community of interest or title in the product of the latter as to bring
the case within the scope of the Act. - Since the purpose of the
clause is to prevent injustice to the shipping public from discriminations which inevitably grew up when railroads occupied' the
inconsistent positions of carrier and shipper, such corporate relationship is within the scope of the language of the Act, for the
operations of the coal company are conducted under 1 the "same
'authority.'" that transports the coal over the railroad. 3
In view of the above and preceding constructions the question
naturally arises concerning what disposition will be made in reference to the industrially owned railroads. Many of these have
been held common carriers in interstate commerce by the Interstate Commerce Commission." The Commission, however, has
refused to take jurisdiction in one case where the illegality of this
corporate relationship under the commodities clause was alleged. 5
The decision of this question is of supreme importance to the
industrial world.
Another question of importance, the solution of which would
solve many of the difficulties in the reorganization of corporations
affected by the operation of the commodities clause, is whether
the illegality of the relationship would disappear if the stock of
the coal companies is distributed among the stockholders of the
railroad. It would seem that such illegality might disappear if
there was an absolute dissociation in management of the coal
company and of title in the coal property on the part of the railroad.16
By the decree of dissolution against the Reading Company,
that company was not permitted to retain its stock ownership in
either the Railway Company or the Coal Company. It is difficult
to understand why stock ownership in one of the companies was
not permitted; such ownership can hardly be said to be in violation of the clause.
In the Reading Company case the Supreme Court has clearly
departed from its position taken in the Delaware and Hudson
case and the basis of its decision is the underlying policy of the
11United States v. Reading Co. et al, 40 Sup. Ct. 425 (1920). While the
action in this case was brought primarily under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
it is not thought worth while to discuss the decision thereunder, since decisions

under that Act frequently vary under the same state of facts.
12Id., p. 433.
3Id-, P. 434.

11American Steel & Wire Co. v. Newburgh & South Shore Ry. Co. et at,
5-5 1. C. C. 353 (i919); Pittsburgh, Allegh'any & McKees Rocks R. R. Co. v.
Director General, Pennsylvanian Co. et al, 57 1. C. C. 1 (1920).
"5Second Industrial1 Railways Case, 57 1. C. C. 371 (1920).
16 United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., suepra,
pp. 526-529.
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clause. In the light of the previous decision, supra, and that
in the Reading case it is difficult to see how any corporate relationship between a carrier and a manufacturing or producing
company, in which there is unity of control through stock ownership or by means of a holding company. can keep without the
prohibitions of the clause. It is submitted that unless there is
absolute dissociation in management between the corporations,
any form of corporate relationship between a carrier in interstate
commerce and a producing company is in violation of the prohibitions of the clause.
J.G.L.
DIVORCE - RECRIMINATION. - "The term 'recrimination,'
w,-hile not absolutely unknown in the other departments of our
civil and criminal jurisprudence, is almost peculiar to divorce
law. But the thing itself-the refusal of redress to a plaintiff who
is himself at fault in that whereof he complains-is a familiar
and fundamental principle in our entire legal system.", In other
words, he who asks equity must do equity, he must come into
court with clean hands.
In order to constitute an adequate defense by way of recrimination to a proceedings for divorce, the conduct complained
of in the plaintiff must be such as would have entitled the defendant to a divorce on that ground. 2 -Thus it has been frequently
decided that adultery,3 cruelty,4 and desertion5 when set up as
recriminatory defenses, will bar an action for divorce, since these
are all causes which in the respective jurisdictions would entitle
the party in whose defense they are pleaded to an original decree
of divorce.
It is rather startling to find the Michigan Supreme Court
in a recently decided case 6 refusing a divorce sought on the ground
of extreme cruelty, because the plaintiff wife was found to have
been carrying on a clandestine correspondence with a young man.
This clandestine correspondence, which it may confidently be
said, would not be ground for divorce in any jurisdiction, was
held by the court to be a sufficient recriminatory defense. The
case 7 which was pointed to as authority for this decision 'was one
in which the guilt of plaintiff and defendant had been so extreme
that the court observed, "If a tenth part of the testimony of
either party is to be believed, the other party has been guilty of
the same misconduct as that charged. Neither party deserves
I Bishop: Marriage, Divorce & Separation.
2 Epley v. Epley, 83 N. J. Eq. 214, 89 At. 1028 (1914).
Decker v. Decker, 193 111. 285, 6i N. E. xio8 (I9ox);'Earle

Earle, 43 Oregon 293, 72 Pac. 976 (i9o3).Church v. Church, i6 R. 1. 667, i9 At. 244 (1890).
1 Coe v. Coe, 98 Mo. App. 472, 72 S. W. 707 (1903).
'Cowdrey v. Cowdrey, 178 N. W. 678 (Mich. 1920).
Kellogg v. Kellogg, 171 Mich. 518, 137 N. V.249 (1912).

v.

NOTES
particular consideration at the hands of the court." Plainly that
case was in conformity with the general rule regarding recrimination, and no basis for the radical departure embodied in the recent
decision.
In Illinois, desertion and cruelty are grounds for divorce
a vinculo matrimonji. It has been held by the courts of Illinois,
that a right of action upon the ground of adultery is not affected
by the fact of the plaintiff's previous desertion, 8 or extreme and
repeated cruelty.9 The position taken in this jurisdiction is,
however, against the great weight of authority.'0 When other
courts have considered matters far more serious than clandestine
correspondence, but which were not themselves grounds for divorce, such as neglect of marital obligations," personal violence,12
and malicious turning wife out of doors,1 3 the decisions have been
that these did not raise valid defer'es of recrimination. The
attitude of the courts therefore is plainly to limit the defense of
recrimination strictly to facts which themselves would sustain
an action for divorce; some courts, as Illinois, going so far as to,
limit this defense to a charge of moral turpitude equal to that
upon which the divorce is being sought; and not as in the Michigan
case to allow the slightest misconduct to stand in the way of the
relief demanded.
Our century is one which seems to favor a reasonable facility
in the obtaining of divorce. It would appear, therefore, that the
Michigan court has not only decided contrary to the great weight
of authority, but in seizing upon this excuse for refusing the divorce, has also seen fit to exercise its discretion against this modern
tendency.
S. B. R.

NEW TRIAL-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARTIAL NEW TRUL
oN DA3TAGE QUEsTION ONLY.-The Constitutionality under the
Federal Constitution of a new trial limited to certain issues is
considered for the first time in a recent case in the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit., The trial judge in a personal
injury case had granted a new trial limited to the assessment of
damages, which had been inadequate in the first trial. The Circuit Court held that such a partial new trial is in violation of the
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitittion,_preserving the right of trial by jury in Federal Courts.
8 Huling v. Huling, 38 Ill. App. 144. (i89o).
9 Hughes v. Hughes, 133 Ill. App. 654 (907).
,oNote in 39 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1135.
n Cushman v. Cushman, i94 Masts. 38, 79 N. E. 89 (1907).
12 Bailey v. Bailey, 67 N. H. 4o2,29 AtI. 847 (1892).
13 Elletr v. Ellett, 157 N. C. 161, 72 S. E. 86r (1911).
14Blickle v. Higbee, supra.
1 McKeon v. Central Stamping Company, 264 Fed. 385 (U. S. C. C. A.
3rd Circuit, 1920).
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In 19o6 in a case in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit,2 the Court declared that it "is undoubtedly the -rule atcommon law" that such partial new trials should not be granted.
This statement was dictum in that case, however, for the court
approved sending that very case back for a new trial on the damage question alone, upon the authority of Rev. Stat.. 7or, which
grants the Supreme Court flexible powers in modifying judgments.
The constitutionality of the order made in the case was not considered by the Court.
Although it is true that no cases can be found in the early
common law of England wheie a partial new trial was ordered,
yet neither are there early cases which hold such a new trial improper. And several cases strenuously oppose the conclusion
reached in the Farrarcase and in the present case, that the common4
law rule was opposed to partial new trials.- In one of these cases,
after a full discussion of the authorities, an order similar to the one
in the present case was held constitutional under a provision in
the state constitution of Mississippi substantially the same as the
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Within the last hundred years, the English courts have in
many instances approved the ordering of partial new trials. 5 By
a rule of court under the present Judicature Act, authority to
grant a limited new trial is expressly conferred upon the English
courts.6

In a large number of American jurisdictions, new trials limited to one question only are ordered by the Court, in some cases
by statutory authority .(as in the Farrarcase, supra), but generally without special enactment, as a part of the inherent power
of the court, where the matter in that question is separable from
that in the other issues. 7 A few American cases deny that the
Court has authority to limit the issues in granting a new trial.8
The question seems not to have arisen in Pennsylvania.
The conclusions of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the present case are based on the theory of rigid interpretation of the
2 Farrar v.

Vheeler, 145 Fed. 486, 75 C. C. A. 386 (19o6).
Clark v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 33 R. I. 83, 8o AtI. 4o6, Ann. Cas.
1913 B. 356; Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N. E. io2, Ann. Cas. 1922 D.
588 annotated; Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Scott, io8 Miss. 871, 67 So. 491,
L. R. A. 1915 E. 239, annotated.
4 Yazoo & M. V. R. R. Co. v. Scott, supra.
6
Hutchinson v. Piper, 4 Taunt. 555 (Eng. 1812); Thwaites v. Sainsbury,
7 Bing. 437 (Eng. 1831); Price v. Harris, io Bing. 332 (Eng. 1833). See the
collection and discussion of these and other similar English cases in Clark v.
N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., cited in footnote 3.
6The Annual Practice (iqi5), page 7132.
7 Smith v. Whittlesey, 79 Conn. i89, 63 AtI. 1085, 7 Ann. Cas. 114 (19o6);
Winn v. Columbia Ins. Co., x2 Pick. 279 (Mass. 1831); Ferebee v. Norfolk So.
R. Co., 163 N. C. 351, 79 S. E. 685 (affirmed by U. S. Supreme Court in 238
U. S. 269 (2925)); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Scott, supra.
8 Cerny v. Paxton & G. Co., 83 Neb. 88, 119 N. W. 14 (29o8); Peed v.
Brenneman, 72 Ind. 228; (i88o); Long v. Garnett, 45 Texas 400 (1876).
3
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Seventh Amendment, a tendency well illustrated in the United
States Supreme Court by three recent cases, 9 all of which condemn as unconstitutional the practice of granting judgment non
obstante veredicto in the Federal Courts. The argument for a
broader construction of the amendment is presented by Justice
Hughes in an able dissenting opinion in the first of the three cases
mentioned.10
The decision in the present case, requiring a second litigation of the entire case when the only error has been on one issue,
seems opposed to the desired elimination of waste motion and
delay in legal procedure, and not actually in conflict with the
Constitution, since on all but the one issue now sent back the
parties have obtained the fair trial guaranteed to them by the
Constitution.1
R.D.
Slocum v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364 (1912); Pedersen v. D. L.
& W. R. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146 (1913); Myers v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 233 U. S.

184 (1914).

10 Slocum v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra.
11Compare the discussion by Justice Doe in Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H.
553 (1870); also the opinion in Simmons v. Fish, cited in footnote 3.

